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Archived Articles
Simeon Mitropolitski is a Canadian analyst, of Bulgarian origin, and a former syndicated columnist with the Bulgarian News Agency (BTA). He is the author of several hundred articles dealing with hot political and economic topics, both national and international.
He was part of the first group of Bulgarian intellectuals and students that began the opposition movement that finally put an end to the communist regime in this country in 1989, and in 1996-1997 participated in international observation teams during the elections in several Balkan countries - Romania, Albania and Bulgaria.
In 2002 Simeon and his family moved from Bulgaria to Canada where they live now in Montreal, province of Quebec. Simeon is a Master of Political Science from McGill University and a B.A. of Political Science and History.
Global Real Estate Project
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Cuba: Getting closer and closerIt's almost official; Fidel Castro is out of business. It's a matter of time before he's gone. Power already moved away toward second tier of communist party officials, as we predicted not so long ago (*). There is a short window of opportunity for political opening due to conflict of interests within ruling regime. American reaction to this process is crucial. Providing enough foreign guarantees to those in power may lead to 'sudden' and irreversible liberalization. More than that, exposing true nature of regime in Cuba may lead to cascading effect against raising leftist populist regimes in Latin America. Decommunization of Cuba may lead to split within left movements across entire continent. Moderate left forces will then be able presenting constitutional, not revolutionary, alternatives to crony capitalism and corrupt rightwing elites. We all remember scenes of violence on TV, and we usually link regime change with such scenes. In fact, however, most regime changes are designed in quiet office, away from streets, between few plotters, usually with no cameras to catch this historic moment. Society just moving away from totalitarian charismatic leader is especially predisposed to such activities. In power, this charismatic leader, e.g. Stalin, Mao, Fidel Castro, tries to keep other regime dignitaries at sufficient distance below; otherwise they will threaten his power or will eat off his charisma. He's giant and they must be dwarfs. Once this leader gone, he creates vacuum on the top, vacuum most dwarfs want to occupy. They may eventually agree on power sharing as a result of or without prolonged conflict of power interests. Behind each dwarf there are special interests, military, secret police, economic, social, so this struggle for power goes beyond simplistic personal war. Fidel Castro is exceptionally clever politician. While still alive, he allows for a sufficient period of elite accommodation in order to have unified regime at the time of his death. Months that remain before we see him gone may however be not enough for consolidating this 'new deal'. We still don't see new strong charismatic leader, which is a very good sign. Talks that 'sole successor of Fidel Castro is communist party' are very encouraging. For people with no experience with this kind of regime this may sound irrelevant, but in fact this is a sign that communism in Cuba enters its terminal phase. As society and economy become more complex, no single interest may be imposed without creating power backlash. From ideologically and personality driven, regime accepts its bureaucratic nature; it becomes less aggressive and more tolerant. When Fidel Castro dies we may still see new regime as unconsolidated. This is a short and very important window of opportunity for regime change. People on the top in Cuba may have very different interests within the system, but they all share one important feature, they all profit from this system; it's this system that puts them on the top after all, without it they are just ordinary persons without power and privileges. For them real choice isn't communism or democracy, because this is choice between power and no power. Real choice for them is between power within communist system or outside it. Sufficient foreign guarantees coming from the United States may buttress new regime choice for partial liberalization. Such guarantees may include property rights protection of 'nomenklatura' against private claims of former owners. It may also include guarantees against criminal prosecutions and policy of lustration. Why new Cuban regime after Fidel Castro will like such deal with America and via America with its political émigrés? Current regime is a creation of revolution, and officially nobody can claim private share in public goods. In fact most public goods like economy, tourism, are in fact managed like private companies. Their managers however will prefer having legal title on this property, exactly like in Eastern Europe after 1989. Legal privatization under communism isn't possible except for very small units like cafes or restaurants. Large privatization requires new kind of regime, implies possible social opposition, and thus necessitates strong capitalist foreign support. Why the United States will agree upon and will respect the terms of such deal? This deal after all will not provide full satisfaction to former owners and Cuban political émigrés. Seeing how former communists turn into prosperous businesspersons and new capitalist exploiters however will have devastating ideological effect on left populist movements across Latin America. A split will occur between these movements and constitutional left, it occurred the same way in Western Europe after Hungary'56 and Czechoslovakia'68. No need to tell again, without this split there wouldn't be left rule in Germany in 1970s, and in France, Spain, and Greece in 1980s.
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See also the directory of companies providing real estate services in, and general real estate information of Cuba.
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