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Simeon Mitropolitski

Simeon Mitropolitski is a Canadian analyst, of Bulgarian origin, and a former syndicated columnist with the Bulgarian News Agency (BTA). He is the author of several hundred articles dealing with hot political and economic topics, both national and international.

He was part of the first group of Bulgarian intellectuals and students that began the opposition movement that finally put an end to the communist regime in this country in 1989, and in 1996-1997 participated in international observation teams during the elections in several Balkan countries - Romania, Albania and Bulgaria.

In 2002 Simeon and his family moved from Bulgaria to Canada where they live now in Montreal, province of Quebec. Simeon is a Master of Political Science from McGill University and a B.A. of Political Science and History.

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11 March 2004

Lebanon: Myths are still alive

© 2004, IRED.Com, Inc., Simeon Mitropolitski

It's impossible to speak about Lebanon without thinking about or mentioning in one way or another the civil war that raged throughout the country and especially in its capital Beirut for 16 years between 1975 and 1991. This war has produced many widows, but also has created some myths inside and outside the country, that still determine the behavior of many decision-makers, which in one way or another do business with Lebanon or try to rebuild their homeland. What are these myths about, are they useful somehow or not for the country's reconstruction and what is the place of Lebanon in the new regional map; all these questions have no easy answers and in most parts depend on the particular point of view of the observers, most of whom are by no means unbiased and objective.

One of the constructive myths about Lebanon spread among its population is that the country can be rebuilt and entitled to play the same role as it did before the civil war. This role, mainly in the financial sphere, consisted in attracting the large part of the Arab capitals, fleeing the nationalist regimes of many regional powers. Before the start of the "petrodollar's" age, this pool of financial strength allowed the Lebanon politicians to play a disproportionately bigger role amidst their Arab counterparts than the sheer size and population of Lebanon allowed assuming. Finally this financial manna played a certain role in starting the civil war itself. The regional predators, far from abandoning the idea of taking back what they saw as part of their national wealth, using mainly their local protégés, tried to put a hand on the whole power in Lebanon. In a sense this fight was for money although many on the ground believed it was waged in the name of higher religious principles.

During the last 30 years many things have changed in the Middle East. Gradually Cyprus has taken the role of local offshore financial center. The main source of revenue for many Arab countries comes from the oil exports or direct international aid. The money that was once taken out from some Arab countries by fear of nationalization has gone back after substantial process of laundering and hardly anybody can say now for sure what are the real origins of one or another private investment in the region. Many Arab countries with no oil resources have established direct financial links with the Western bankers and don't need Lebanese brokerage anymore. In a word, the desire to turn again Lebanon in what it was once is a myth.

As such however it plays a certain role in shaping the political and economic views of decision-makers in Beirut. Once the war ended major financial resources of the country were dedicated to attract the big international companies, and not in gradually improving the living standard of the middle class. The idea was that the upper segments of the society would pull up all the rest. The result is that the average Lebanese now lives poor life and Beirut is among the most expensive cities in the world. But the myth of Lebanon before 1975 still lives on. To try to fix it many people in Lebanon will read as abandoning something of their national identity. What was made possible 40 years ago can't be replicated anymore because the times are different.

Another myth, this time coming from outside the country, puts a sign of equality between Lebanon and the regional political instability. There would be no peaceful Lebanon; the state will always be in danger of internal collapse. It's just a matter of time to see Lebanon becoming another Somalia or Haiti, a territory without a legitimate authority. Such myth dwells on the fact that large parts of Lebanon are still under foreign occupation, and that other parts are under local militia's authority. This is true, but these myths don't pay attention to other facts, such as the more or less financial stability in the country. The foreign tourists, although preferring to visit not individually but in a group, don't report feeling like in a midst of a civil war. Of particular interest discrediting this myth is the fact that Lebanon introduced the concept of faction sharing of the political power, which was later applied more or less successfully in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Lebanon has brought to life some useful tools in dealing with ethnic and religious intolerance. Its lessons are used in many parts of the world.

There are of course dangers for the political stability in Lebanon, but again as in 1975 they mainly have foreign addressees. Syria continues to use the country as a bargain chip to push Israel out of the Golan Heights, maintaining substantial force in central and eastern parts of Lebanon. Israel, which pulled out of Southern Lebanon in 2000, could at any time reoccupy this territory, although chances for such move now appear to be very slim. For lack of better prospective, the best forecast for Lebanon will be to assume that the country will stagnate where it's right now, with no clear vision for the future outside the dream of restoring its past magnificence. Being too expensive for the smaller investors, too risky for the international companies and too ordinary for the average tourists, Lebanon's future will depend on the general political and economic improvement in the region. The country couldn't be able to make it alone.

Lebanon country profile:
  • Area: 10,400 sq km
  • Population: 3.7 million (July 2003 est.)
  • Life expectancy at birth: 72.07 years
  • Total fertility rate: 1.98 children born/woman (2003 est.)
  • Ethnic groups: Arab 95%, Armenian 4%, other 1%
  • Religions: Muslim 70% (including Shi'a, Sunni, Druze, Isma'ilite, Alawite or Nusayri), Christian 30% (including Orthodox Christian, Catholic, Protestant)
  • GDP per capita: purchasing power parity $4,800 (2002 est.)
  • Population below poverty line: 28% (1999 est.)
  • Main trading partners: EU countries, Switzerland, Saudi Arabia, United States.
  • Internet users: 300,000 (2001)
(Source: CIA - The World Factbook 2003)

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See also the directory of companies providing real estate services in, and general real estate information of Lebanon.

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