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Simeon Mitropolitski is a Canadian analyst, of Bulgarian origin, and a former syndicated columnist with the Bulgarian News Agency (BTA). He is the author of several hundred articles dealing with hot political and economic topics, both national and international.
He was part of the first group of Bulgarian intellectuals and students that began the opposition movement that finally put an end to the communist regime in this country in 1989, and in 1996-1997 participated in international observation teams during the elections in several Balkan countries - Romania, Albania and Bulgaria.
In 2002 Simeon and his family moved from Bulgaria to Canada where they live now in Montreal, province of Quebec. Simeon is a Master of Political Science from McGill University and a B.A. of Political Science and History.
Global Real Estate Project
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Tunisia: Maybe better than it looksFocused only on human rights violations, Internet censorship, administrative nepotism, and sham elections, we may make misleading conclusions about the state of affairs in one of the leading modernizing Arab countries, Tunisia. Staring at its flaws is a useful exercise as far as it doesn't mislead us to think that the situation is as bad as in, let's say, Syria. Russia is a country that looks much closer to the current situation of Tunisia in terms of openness. It's the social mood that makes Tunisia better off. If in countries like Russia predominant social attitudes are pushing it away from the West, in Tunisia, on the contrary, predominant mood, especially among younger generations, is remarkably pro-western. Throughout the years we covered Tunisia's uneven social development. We didn't hide anything that might look disturbing. Tunisia now isn't a free country in any possible meaning. People cannot choose rulers; they aren't free to express opinions that may be considered subversive for the government. Especially after 9/11 the government has one more reason to fear political dissidence and to use this fear against real and imaginary opposition, the threat of radical religious fundamentalism. Tunisia's main foreign sponsor, France, actually doesn't care too much about the quality of democracy in most developing countries. All this is true, but Tunisia isn't Syria or Iraq under Saddam, after all. Political oppression is done in much milder way. Consider these facts, in Tunisia the government punishes dissidents by denying them medical services, by firing them from jobs, by denying them the right to gather by using judicial system. A government that uses such tools is oppressive, no doubt, but it tries not to look oppressive. There is obviously something special in the case of Tunisia, something that forces the government to apply repression without appearing too much repressive. One possible explanation is that Tunisia wants not to annoy the European Union, with which it has signed a treaty of association. This explanation at first seems plausible, but in fact the EU isn't a major factor in Tunisia. Brussels doesn't consider Tunisia even remotely as a potential member state. With its leverage being low, the EU cannot force any country to change its political regime nature unless clear prospective for membership is provided. Second, it's actually France that maintains privileged relations with Tunisia. Paris supports a different concept of human rights than Washington or London. According to this concept, a well-nourished and well-educated population has enough human rights regardless of political regime. I will look for explanations regarding this relative Tunisian moderation in the social mood that shapes the political institutions and governmental policy. Unlike countries such as Russia, where mild authoritarianism is supported by predominantly anti-western public sentiments, in Tunisia the public opinion is actually very much pro-European. With no real job perspectives, Tunisian youth looks at Europe as a natural first choice for professional development. An interesting phenomenon is gradually making its way; people in Tunisia develop what they call 'Mediterranean' identity. This means that they feel the Europeans from the other side of the Mediterranean as culturally closer than some other Muslims and Arabs such as Iranians and Saudis. I can draw certain parallels with late communist societies in Eastern Europe. In the 1970s and 1980s the predominant mood was that these societies are much closer culturally to the West than to Soviet Union, especially to its Central Asian republics. In hindsight, it seems obvious that this mood was one of the forerunners for the incoming demise of the communist system. It will be interesting to see if such 'Mediterranean' identity may lead to demise of the pan-Arab and pan-Islamic identity in countries such as Tunisia and Morocco. Not that men and women in Tunisia will stop thinking about themselves as Arab or Muslim; the question is whether these identities will stop being so dominant and politically charged.
Tunisia country profile: --------------------
See also the directory of companies providing real estate services in, and general real estate information of Tunisia.
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